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Ryszard Rapacki 
Poland and Greece – Two Contrasting 
EU Enlargement Experiences 
 
1.  Introduction 
Seen from the European Union perspective (and in particular – that of the 
Euro area), the recent, US-born global financial and economic crisis of 
2008-09 can be interpreted as a source of a negative external shock that 
triggered a chain reaction which – under the worst-case scenario – may 
endanger the very existence of the European Monetary Union. 
Simultaneously, as explained by the theory of optimal currency areas, the 
shock has shown its asymmetric nature – while most of the EMU members 
suffered a relatively short-lived recession, in a few countries (most notably, 
in Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain) it revealed the extreme 
vulnerability of their economies to adverse economic conditions. In more 
general terms, this trend seems to also hold for the entire European Union 
as the 2008-09 crisis emphasized wide disparities among the member 
countries with regard to their resilience to adverse external shocks. 
At the level of individual countries, Greece and Poland stick out as polar 
cases of the most vulnerable vs. the most shock-resistant EU members, 
respectively. In a broader historical perspective, both countries can be 
conceived as representatives of two groups of ‘latecomers’ to the EU that – 
in different points of time (i.e. between 1973 and 1986, and 2004-2007) –
joined the ‘core’ of the European Community (Union). The first group 
comprises Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain (GIPS) while the second – 
ten former socialist countries or transition economies from Central and 
Eastern Europe (CEE-10) – Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Ryszard Rapacki 
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Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. The very fact 
of being latecomers may be seen as a common denominator for the two 
groups of countries which allows a comparative analysis of their strengths 
and weaknesses as candidates and then – full members of the European 
Union. This comparative approach is based on two additional premises. 
First, today’s troubles of most GIPS, and in particular Greece, are due to 
their institutional weaknesses of structural, long-term nature. The global 
economic and financial crisis just triggered the problems deeply embedded 
in their distorted development patterns and ineffective institutional 
infrastructure of the market. On the other hand, the resilience of some 
CEE-10 countries to external shocks as well as the fast recovery of those 
adversely affected by the crisis may be seen as a function of the remarkable 
progress they made in the process of systemic transformation and the 
resulting relatively high quality of their institutional set up. 
Second, despite many essential differences between the two groups 
involved, they exhibit one fundamental similarity which makes possible 
comparisons of the effects of two past EU enlargements in terms of 
macroeconomic performance and the quality of institutions, and in 
particular – their resilience to external asymmetric shocks. The similarity in 
question boils down to the starting position of the entrants at the time of 
their EU accession and will be described in more detail in the next section. 
The aim of this contribution is a comparative analysis of the challenges 
Poland and Greece (and more broadly – CEE-10 and GIPS countries) had 
to face in the past as latecomers to the European Union and are facing now, 
in the aftermath of the world financial and economic crisis of 2008-09. 
The main underlying message conveyed in this text is two-fold. Firstly, the 
author is going to argue that the breadth and complexity of the challenges 
Poland and other CEE-10 countries had to face while entering the road of 
systemic transformation was by far greater compared to past and in 
particular – current problems of Greece (and the remaining GIPS countries) 
in the aftermath of the global financial and economic crisis of 2008-09. 
Secondly, a resilience of Poland and other CEE-10 economies, relative to 
Greece and other GIPS, to the recent crisis was due to a comparatively Poland and Greece – Two Contrasting EU Enlargement Experiences 
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higher level of institutional development of the former group at the time of 
their EU accession and at present. 
The ensuing discussion is organized as follows. Section 2 below provides 
comparative background information on the two reference groups. In 
Section 3 we discuss the most salient features of the design of the 
command economy and its legacy, as a key determinant of the initial 
conditions of systemic transformation. Next, in Section 4 we overview the 
basic indicators of growth performance and institutional reforms in CEE-10 
countries between 1990 and 2011. Section 5 offers a picture of economic 
growth and real economic convergence in Greece and the remaining GIPS 
countries. In Section 6 we embark on comparative analysis of the 
institutional quality of Greece and Poland against a broader background of 
GIPS, CEE-10 and the remaining EU member countries. Section 7 
concludes with a summary of major findings.   
 
2.  Comparative Background – CEE-10 vs. GIPS 
Before embarking on a substantive discussion it seems advisable to first 
briefly overview the basic similarities and differences between CEE-10 and 
GIPS countries.  
As mentioned earlier, the two groups of countries concerned share one 
fundamental similarity that is the starting position at the time of their EU 
accession – both CEE-10 and GIPS after the Second World War remained 
for years on the periphery of the mainstream economic development and 
regional integration in Europe.
1 For CEE countries this trend was of special 
nature – as a result of the Tehran and Yalta treaties they were left behind 
the ‘Iron curtain’ as formal parts (republics) or ‘imperial clusters’ of the 
Soviet Union.  
 
1   In case of Spain and Portugal – due to their Nazi involvement during the war – this 
trend was compounded by the subsequent political ostracism until 1974, i.e. the 
collapse of Franco and Salazar regimes. Ryszard Rapacki 
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Since 1948 their development paths had widely diverged from the patterns 
established in the Western world due to ideological and political hostility 
(cold war) and the implementation of the Soviet-style institutional system 
of central planning (or the command economy). As a result, over time both 
groups of economies tended to increasingly lag behind the core EU 
countries in terms of their economic and institutional development and 
were subject to real economic as well as institutional divergence. 
Among the most essential differences the following appear to be of 
particular significance. 
(a)  Pre-Accession Development Level 
At the time of joining the European Union (Community) the entrants 
represented as a rule a significantly lower level of economic development 
than the ‘incumbent’ countries. However, the most recent EU enlargement 
in 2004 and 2007 entailed an unprecedented scale of pertinent income gaps. 
While for the GIPS group the level of GDP per capita in purchasing power 
parity (PPP) in 1980 represented  between 60 (Portugal) and 80 per cent 
(Greece) of the EU15 average (for Ireland – 66%, and for Spain – 76%, see 
table 4) a similar indicators for CEE-10 countries in 2003 ranged between 
27% (Bulgaria) and 74% (Slovenia); the index for Romania amounted to 
30%, Latvia – 38%, Poland and Lithuania – 43%, Estonia and Slovakia – 
48%, Hungary – 55%, and for the Czech Republic – 68% (see table 1).  
(b) Pre-Accession Institutional Development 
At the time of accession, both groups of latecomers to the European Union 
had functioning market institutions and political democracy though at 
lower levels of development compared to old EU members. However, 
unlike the previous entrants the CEE-10 countries could rely on pre-
accession funds from Brussels aimed at supporting market reforms and 
structural changes. As a result, by 2004 or 2007 the quality of their 
institutions relative both to their level of economic development and 
compared to Ireland (1973), Greece (1982), and Portugal and Spain (1986) 
was above the levels prevailing in the latter group. 
  Poland and Greece – Two Contrasting EU Enlargement Experiences 
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(c) Complexity of Development and Institutional Challenges 
The overriding objective of the GIPS was a real and institutional 
convergence to the standards established in the ‘old’ EU member countries 
(Germany, France, UK, etc.), within the existing institutional framework of 
a market economy and political democracy (or capitalism). Hence, seen 
from a broader systemic angle all four countries can be deemed as insiders 
in the Western-type capitalist world. In a sharp contrast to this pattern, for 
the CEE-10 or former socialist countries the challenges on their road to a 
fully-fledged EU membership were of a double nature: (i) to depart from a 
centrally-planned system with a view to initiate and implement systemic 
transformation aimed at building from scratch a fully-fledged market-
driven economy and political democracy, (ii) to implement the acquis 
communautaire  and to fully integrate their economies with the EU 
including the real, nominal and institutional convergence. This implied an 
historically unprecedented challenge compared to GIPS – building the 
whole system of non-existing institutions while simultaneously dismantling 
the old ones incompatible with market economy (‘creative destruction’). In 
other words, unlike the former group, CEE-10 countries joined the 
European Union as outsiders to the capitalist system. 
 
3.   The Ontology of the Command Economy and its 
Legacy  
With a view to better understand the nature and complexity of challenges 
the CEE-10 countries faced on their road from plan to market (or from 
socialism to capitalism) and to their subsequent integration with the 
European Union, in this section we will briefly describe the most salient 
features of the design of a centrally-planned or command economy. Next, 
we will also discuss the most important components of the command 
economy legacy that tended to strongly determine the initial conditions of 
systemic transformation thus adversely affecting the pace and costs of this 
process.  Ryszard Rapacki 
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While discussing the most salient features of “real” socialism, we will first 
outline the role of politics and the power relations, including their 
interrelationships with the economic sub-system, and then describe the 
essence of the centrally-planned economy alone. The rationale behind such 
an approach lies in the dominant role of political and ideological factors as 
drivers of the whole system, and their primacy over economics, i.e. the 
design and mode of operation of the command economy. 
3.1. Politics and Economics  
In order to best describe the essence of the socialist system one should start 
with its most crucial single characteristic, which was its mono-centric 
nature. All, more or less important, matters were decided upon by the 
political (or the power) centre whose nucleus was embedded in the 
professional apparatus of the monopoly-ruling communist party. The 
monopoly in question boiled down to the exclusive right of the power 
centre to make use of available resources (including factors of production), 
of means and channels of information (propaganda), and of the coercion 
apparatus (security, police and armed forces). 
The second salient feature of the socialist mode of production consisted in 
reducing the task of power exercising mostly to the function of managing 
the national economy.
2 Simultaneously, the political centre assumed a very 
strong ruling position (domination) in the economy. If one bears in mind 
that – in general terms – the designs and internal structures of the political 
and economic sub-systems are by definition very distinct and that they are 
driven by different types of rationality (the goal of the political centre is to 
retain power while that of the economic sub-system is to achieve 
efficiency), the resulting incompatibility of goals and types of rationality 
gives rise to mounting contradictions. The latter emerge both at the stage of 
formulating the objectives and designing the tools of economic policy and 
in the course of its implementation. 
 
2   According to one Polish economist, about 80 per cent of all decisions taken by the 
Political Bureau of the Polish United Workers Party (PZPR) dealt with economic 
issues. See J. Gościński, Chances for a Transplant (in Polish), interview in Przegląd 
Techniczny – Innowacje, no. 19, 1981. Poland and Greece – Two Contrasting EU Enlargement Experiences 
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The third key property of “real” socialism was the widespread use of the 
system of nomenklatura which generated in turn the mechanism for 
negative selection to key positions in state-owned enterprises (or SOEs) 
and government administration.
3 Neither initiative nor innovativeness 
appears to have dominated the characteristics of individuals that party 
officials typically appointed or promoted. More important was the ability to 
function effectively in the bureaucratic environment. The risk-averse 
behavior in turn strengthened the position of political officials who 
rewarded obedience and passivity with promotions. 
The primacy of politics over economics in socialist countries made, among 
other things, the very design and the basic properties of the economic 
mechanism to simply replicate some of the core building blocks and 
solutions applied in the mono-centric political system. This explains why 
the economic mechanism (i.e. the central planning and administrative 
allocation of resources) was much better suited to pursue non-economic 
tasks and objectives (such as retaining the power in the first place, 
articulating social interests, etc.) than to fulfill strictly economic functions.  
Similarly, even the economic sub-system tended to exhibit internal 
inconsistencies and contradictions being a derivative of “genetic” frictions 
between two different kinds of rationality embedded in the economic 
mechanism. The task of managing the command economy used to be 
performed in parallel through two distinct, partly overlapping channels – 
the communist party apparatus and the administrative one. Needless to say 
that it was the party apparatus that enjoyed the actual sovereign position in 
the centrally-planned economy. Decisions delivered through the party-
controlled channel were as a matter of fact unofficial yet binding. On the 
other hand, official decisions were communicated through the 
administrative channel but in practice they proved to be not binding.
4  
 
3   See, R. Rapacki, East-West Licence Trade. A Theoretical Contribution (in Polish), 
Monografie i Opracowania SGPiS, Warsaw 1986.  
4   Another possible catch term well describing this practice was: driving a car by the 
communist party from the back seat. See, W. Jermakowicz, The Economy and the 
Social System. A Study of the Organization of the Socio-Economic System in the 
Context of Economic Reform (in Polish), Polish Economic Society, Warsaw 1981. 
 Ryszard Rapacki 
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One of the most essential characteristics of the socialist system was the 
lack of a corrective mechanism. In cybernetics, the latter is dubbed 
homeostatus; it enables to maintain the whole system in a state of dynamic 
equilibrium or homeostasis. In the capitalist system, this function is being 
performed by the market – inextricably coupled with the mechanism of 
political democracy. The homeostatic mechanism of this kind provides the 
system both with propelling incentives that combine to add dynamic to 
countries’ economic development (i.e. competition) and with restraints that 
inhibit the economy from undertaking  excessive expansion, which would 
endanger its stability (i.e. self-financing). The dynamic equilibrium (or 
homeostasis) in a market economy therefore is due to a proper linkage and 
balance between the propelling and inhibiting incentives. As the historical 
experience clearly demonstrated, such linkages were missing in centrally-
planned economies. Unlike in the market-driven economies, the propelling 
incentives in socialist countries used to be provided by the central planner 
rather than by the market. As the central plan was as a rule an arbitrary 
decision, not subject to any social control, the centrally-planned economy 
had no built-in restraints that would protect it from going beyond the 
“safety barrier” and entering the road of unbalanced and unsustainable 
economic growth. As a derivative of the fact that the political centre’s 
decisions and activities were neither subjected to social control nor were 
they subject to market verification, in the socialist system any decision 
could have been taken.  
3.2. The Key Properties of the Command Economy 
As a derivative of the foregoing characteristics of the political sub-system 
and power relations in real socialism, the economic mechanism underlying 
the operation of the command economy exhibited the following key 
properties:  
  High degree of centralization in economic decision-making, both of 
strategic and operational nature, at the top of the organizational 
hierarchy (Political Bureau, Council of Ministers, Planning 
Commission).   Poland and Greece – Two Contrasting EU Enlargement Experiences 
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  Multi-level organizational structure of the national economy 
consisting of three categories of decision levels: (i) the central 
(macroeconomic) level, (ii) the intermediate (mezoeconomic) level, 
and (iii) the executive (microeconomic) level. For example, in 
Poland, which was mostly similar to other fellow socialist countries 
in this regard, the economic decision making involved four different 
levels: the central planner, branch ministries and industrial unions 
(intermediate level) and state-owned enterprises or SOEs (executive 
level).   
  Hierarchical subordination of the lower-level entities to higher-level 
decision makers or undefined centralization
5 that boils down to the 
lack of clear-cut rules defining the responsibilities and rights of 
decision makers at different levels of the economic bureaucracy.  
  Fulfillment or exceeding of central plan targets as the main 
performance assessment criterion with respect to intermediate and 
executive levels. 
  Administrative, individually targeted allocation of tasks derived from 
the central plan by the power centre to respective lower levels. 
  Leading role of rationing as a chief mechanism for resource 
allocation. 
  Positive correlation of the appraisal yardsticks, aimed at measuring 
economic performance, with outcomes (output) and no correlation 
whatsoever with inputs (negligence for costs efficiency). 
  Dominant role of short-term plans (one-year or shorter) shaping the 
scope and content of economic choices being made by economic 
agents (short-termism). 
 
5    Unlike in the hierarchy of a military type, under this sort of subordination the 
allocation of competences between the levels concerned tends to be blurred and 
vague. As a result, the higher decision level can in practice arbitrarily interfere in 
any matter, which theoretically should be dealt with by a lower level. Undefined 
centralization permitted communist party officials and government administration 
to engage – in a discretionary manner – in both macro- and microeconomic 
management to the detriment of economic efficiency and performance.  See, L. 
Balcerowicz, Organizational Structure of the Economy and Technical Progress (in 
Polish), Ekonomista, no. 6, 1979. Ryszard Rapacki 
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  Lack of integration between material (or physical) and financial 
planning and the secondary significance of the latter.  
  Dominance of the branch principle (vertical integration) in merging 
the lower-level organizations into more complex entities (e.g. SOEs 
into industrial unions). 
  Low flexibility of the organizational structure in the command 
economy. 
  Strong position of executive bodies relative to representative entities. 
  Prevalence of vertical linkages, inherent to the planning process, 
compared to horizontal connections of a market nature (e.g. the 
supplier-customer relationship). 
Due to its very design and built-in structural constraints, with the passage 
of time the centrally-planned economy turned out to be subject to mounting 
flaws and deficiencies. Among the major negative outcomes it generated 
two such effects are particularly worth highlighting. 
(a)  Mounting disturbances in the operation of the resource allocation 
mechanism. This was a derivative of the development of special (vested) 
interests in socialist countries (which was greatly facilitated by the absence 
of institutional channels and mechanisms that would have enabled 
articulation of social preferences), their power being particularly 
pronounced along the branch and regional lines. The special interests, 
embedded within the existing formal organizations (branch ministries, 
industrial unions, etc.), soon became an important yet informal co-
determinant of the economic policy pursued in centrally-planned 
economies; they used to engage in rent-seeking activities aimed at 
preserving the prevailing inefficient structure of the economy to their 
benefit. 
(b)  Emergence of own, informal goals of economic organizations which 
brought about the development of concealed, non-market competition – 
both vertical and horizontal – for central plan targets and means of their 
implementation. The main competitive weapon being widely used towards 
this end (particularly in vertical competition), was the planning 
information. The latter used to be subject to systematic fudging or Poland and Greece – Two Contrasting EU Enlargement Experiences 
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misrepresenting by the lower levels while the central planner reacted with 
ever more challenging plan targets.
6   
3.3. The Command Economy Legacy 
The features of the command economy described in the preceding sub-
section translated over time into new distorted behavioral patterns and 
attitudes, social norms, moral standards and – in general – the prevailing 
system of values in societies leaving the socialist system to head for 
capitalism. As these patterns have displayed surprising inertia and 
persistence and have been carried forward onto the road from plan to 
market it seems appropriate to talk about the command economy legacy in 
transition countries. The latter tended to determine to a large extent the 
initial conditions of systemic transformation and provided for a heavy 
burden that adversely affected the pace and costs of this process. Among 
the most prominent components of the socialist legacy, the following 
deserve a special mention.  
  In most general terms the command economy legacy can be seen in 
the liquidation or atrophy of institutions, regulatory framework and 
system of incentives inherent to the market system.
7 As a result, 
work ethics, entrepreneurship, and the overall business culture have 
been adversely affected. 
  The atrophy of independent thinking and managerial initiative, also 
giving birth to pervasive risk-averse behavior. It can be said that the 
command economy produced in abundant supply those personal 
characteristics and professional skills that are mostly useless for 
effectively managing firms under competitive environment.  
 
6   Among numerous tools and strategies applied by special interest groups in their 
non-market competition for scarce resources and redistribution of the national 
economic pie, we should mention in particular imports of licences that became an 
important rent seeking weapon in most centrally-planned economies (especially in 
Poland) in the 1970s. For a more extensive discussion of the pertinent mechanisms 
and strategies involved in licence imports see e.g. Rapacki, 1986, op. cit. 
7   D. Lipton, J. Sachs, Privatization in Eastern Europe: The Case of Poland, in: V. 
Corbo, F. Coricelli, J. Bossak (eds.), Reforming Central and Eastern European 
Economies. Initial Results and Challenges, The World Bank, Washington, D.C. 
1991. Ryszard Rapacki 
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  Instead, rent-seeking activities tended to dominate behavior of 
economic agents in the state sector.
8 As explained by Baumol
9, the 
allocation of entrepreneurial talent is guided by the incentive 
structure: when the rewards associated with unproductive 
entrepreneurial activities are greater than those linked to productive 
innovations, entrepreneurs will engage in rent-seeking (legal but 
dysfunctional) or organized crime (illegal) activities. Rent-seeking in 
centrally-planned economies involved mostly communist party 
officials, government administration and SOEs’ managers. 
  Parallel to rent-seeking in the upper strata, the command economy 
also produced other distortions affecting the society at large. One of 
its most pronounced legacies was the strongly eroded professional 
ethos and distorted attitudes toward work resulting – inter alia –from 
ill-defined property rights and policies of maintaining wages at a low 
level (they pretend to pay us and we pretend to work). Moreover, as 
suggested by Bukovski
10 these policies may have simultaneously 
contributed to participation in unreported economy activities – albeit 
in varying degree – by nearly all members of society. Such pervasive 
participation by all strata in society effectively created a symbiotic 
relationship between the rulers and those ruled and provided perverse 
legitimization for the communist regime. By the same token it also 
generated a strong incentive to maintain the status quo. 
  Widespread, deeply embedded egalitarian attitudes. Surveys 
conducted in Poland,
11 Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and 
Russia in the 1990s suggests strong resistance to wide salary 
differentials and performance-based pay. Thus, implicitly they also 
adversely affected the social support for the very institution of 
 
8   J. Winiecki, Resistance to Change in the Soviet Economic System. A Property Rights 
Approach, Routledge, London, New York 1991. 
9   W.J. Baumol, 1989, Entrepreneurship: Productive, Unproductive and Destructive, 
Journal of Political Economy, vol. 98, no. 5, 1989. 
10  V. Bukovski, And the Wind Returns… (in Polish), Instytut Literacki, Paris 1984. 
11  Two such surveys for Poland were conducted by the present author and his team in 
1996 and 1998. See R. Rapacki, K. Skoczylas, P. Kulesza, The NIF Program as 
Perceived by Employees. Empirical Findings of a Survey in NIF Portfolio 
Companies (in Polish), Ekonomista, no. 4, 1998.   Poland and Greece – Two Contrasting EU Enlargement Experiences 
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private property and for transition to the market, both on economic 
and political grounds. 
  Egalitarian attitudes have been closely associated with negative 
social perception of education as an important determinant of 
successful professional career under the command economy. The 
same refers to skills and mental work as opposed to manual 
occupations. As a consequence, low social ratings of education and 
mental work impeded at the outset of transition the emergence of 
necessary preconditions for systemic transformations and were 
incompatible with the system of values underlying market economy. 
  The absence of institutions aimed to reveal conflicting group interests 
and mechanisms for their reconciliation and coordination. This 
characteristic of real socialism is one of the chief sources of the non-
market competition described earlier. At the same time, it is conducive 
to the spread of authoritarian styles of management and the 
coalescence of a certain pattern of industrial relations and enterprise 
culture. A side-effect is the lack among all the social and professional 
groups concerned of ability for and habit of dialogue, negotiation and 
conciliatory settlement of nascent conflicts and disputes. 
  State control of collective life. The omnipotence of the state and its 
monopoly of organization of public life, assumption of many of the 
functions of the market and suppression of independent social 
initiatives engendered and perpetuated in many social groups attitudes 
and behavior which are often termed an acquired helplessness 
syndrome. One of the manifestations of this syndrome was the fast 
development of welfarist demands and claims and the growing trend to 
conceive the state as a dispenser of goods, services and privileges. 
Significantly, it was a one-sided attitude: there was no accompanying 
sense of obligations towards the state. As such attitudes took root, 
belief in the individual’s responsibility for his well-being weakened, 
creative and innovative behavior atrophied, and independence of 
thought and initiative gave way to conformism, passivity, strong risk-
aversion and a cult of the slipshod. The entrenchment of such attitudes 
and unhealthy changes in the value scales and aspirations of ever wider Ryszard Rapacki 
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sections of society created a cultural environment and social climate in 
which the destructive effects of the features of the central planning 
system described earlier (undefined centralization, non-market 
competition or negative selection) could take their toll with multiplied 
force. 
  Highly monopolistic structure of production. In Poland, for example, 
the top 500 SOEs (6 percent) provided 47 percent of total sales of 
manufactured goods and generated some 60 percent of net income in 
industry in 1988. Conversely, half of the industrial enterprises 
altogether accounted for only 8 percent of manufacturing sales.
12  
  Deep macroeconomic imbalances confronting each former socialist 
economy at the outset of systemic transformation. In Poland, for 
example, in the fall of 1989, inflation was running at over 3,200 
percent annually, accompanied by widespread shortages of goods 
and accelerated velocity of money circulation, budget deficit reached 
29 percent of government expenditure (average for January-June 
1989), being financed entirely through interests-free central bank 
loans, foreign debt rose to $42 billion (511 percent of exports), 
money supply grew twice as fast as the price level (CPI) and the 
zloty was being “crowded out” by foreign monies (dollarization).
13   
While the centrally-planned economy imposed similar systemic and policy 
parameters upon each of the economies now undergoing transition, 
differences in their institutional, environmental, social, and cultural 
identities are well-established in the comparative economics literature.
14 
These peculiarities or country-specific factors have significantly 
contributed to differentiate the course of systemic transformation in 
particular transition countries. In Poland they comprised in particular:  
 Predominantly private ownership in agriculture since 1956. 
 
12  G. Blazyca and R. Rapacki (eds.), Poland into the 1990s. Economy and Society in 
Transition, Pinter, London 1991. 
13  Ibidem. 
14  See e.g. M. Bornstein, Comparative Economic Systems, 6th edition, Homewood, IL, 
Irwin Press 1989. Poland and Greece – Two Contrasting EU Enlargement Experiences 
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 Relatively large margin of private sector in the economy, compared to 
other socialist countries (19% of GDP in 1988)
15. 
  The institutional arrangements associated with labor-management 
relations since 1956 (sometimes labeled as the Polish ‘Bermuda 
triangle’). 
 A low degree of acceptance of and limited confidence in the very 
institution of state. 
 Relative openness of the country to Western culture and ideas after 
1956, and in particular since 1971 including the (limited) freedom to 
travel and undertake temporary jobs in the West. 
Consequently, due to its command economy legacy and some of its 
institutional peculiarities, Poland – like other former socialist economies – 
was in the turn of 1980s and 1990s ill equipped to initiate a smooth 
transition from plan to market. As a matter of fact, the transition process 
initially created a “systemic vacuum” where neither plan nor market 
governed economic decisions. As the basic institutions inherent to a market 
mechanism were not yet put in place or strongly distorted, and the 
command economy was to a large degree already dismantled, the process 
of systemic transformation at its early stages can be compared to Myrdal’s 
“vicious circle” – solving only one problem at a time when many problems 
need to be tackled simultaneously creates at least two additional 
problems.
16 
  
 
15   B. Milanovic, B., Liberalization and Entrepreneurship: Dynamics of Reform in 
Socialism and Capitalism, Armonk, N.Y., M.E. Sharp, Inc. 1989. 
16  G. Myrdal, An American Dilemma; the Negro Problem and Modern Democracy, 
New York, Harper & Brothers 1944. Ryszard Rapacki 
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4.  Institutional Reforms and Real Convergence in 
Poland and CEE-10 Countries 
In view of the facts described in the preceding section and the historically 
unprecedented challenges former socialist countries had to confront from 
the early 1990s on, the progress they made between 1990 and 2011 in 
pushing through with structural and institutional reforms aimed at building 
from scratch the market infrastructure has been spectacular. This claim 
refers in particular to CEE transition economies who joined the European 
Union in 2004 and 2007 respectively.  
Table 1 below provides a detailed picture of the advancement of market or 
structural reforms in all ten new EU entrants, based on annual EBRD 
assessments. 
 The latter encompass nine institutional areas which are grouped into four 
broader categories:  
(i)  enterprise sector,  
(ii)  development of markets and competition,  
(iii)  financial institutions and  
(iv)  infrastructure.  
The scores range between 1 (institutional development typical for a 
centrally-planned economy) and 4+ (the quality of institutions comparable 
with a pattern prevailing in advanced market economies or the ‚core‘ EU 
members).  
For benchmarking purposes, the table also provides relevant scores for the 
worst-performing transition economies as well as the averages for three 
sub-groups, i.e. the CEE-10, South-Eastern Europe and the CIS countries.   
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Table 1:  Progress in Market Reforms in CEE-10 Transition Countries, 1990-2011 
    
 
Country 
Financial Institutions      b)
  Infrastructure
  Average Score
  Banking Reform and 
Liberalization of Interest 
Rates 
Securities Markets and 
Non-Bank Financial 
Institutions 
Infrastructure Reform 
Poland  3.7 4  3.3  3.84 
Bulgaria  3.7 3 3  3.56 
Czech Republic        a)
  4 3.7  3.3  3.80 
Estonia  4 3.7  3.3  3.92 
Hungary  3.7 4  3.7  3.93 
Latvia  3.7 3 3  3.65 
Lithuania  3.7 3.3 3  3.72 
Romania  3.3 3  3.3  3.50 
Slovakia  3.7 2.7  3.3  3.77 
Slovenia  3.3 3 3  3.43 
Average score EU10  x x  x  3.71 
Bosnia & Herzegovina  3 1.7  2.7  2.84 
Average SEE countries  x x  x  3.11 
Turkmenistan  1 1  1  1,44 
Average CIS countries  x x  x  2,66 
 
Czech Republic, a): Scores for 2007; Financial institutions, b): Scores for 2010. 
Note:     Scale from 1 to 4.3; the higher the score, the greater is the progress in the reform process. 
Source: EBRD,  Transition Report 2011, London 2011; EBRD, Transition Report Database: 
http://www.ebrd.com/pages/research/analysis/forecasts.shtml; own calculations. 
 
Country 
Enterprise Sector  Development of Markets and 
Competition 
 
Large Scale 
Privatization 
 
Small Scale 
Privatization 
Governance 
and Enterprise 
Restructuring 
Price  
Liberalization 
Trade and 
Exchange Rate 
Regime 
Competition 
Policy 
Poland  3.7 4.3 3.7 4.3 4.3  3.3 
Bulgaria  4 4  2.7  4.3  4.3  3 
Czech Republic        a)
  4 4.3  3.3  4.3  4.3  3 
Estonia  4 4.3  3.7  4.3  4.3  3.7 
Hungary  4 4.3  3.7  4.3  4.3  3.7 
Latvia  3.7 4.3  3  4.3 4.3  3.7 
Lithuania  4 4.3 3 4.3  4.3  3.7 
Romania  3.7 3.7 2.7 4.3 4.3  3,3 
Slovakia  4 4.3  3.7  4.3  4.3  3.7 
Slovenia  3 4.3 3  4 4.3  3 
Average score EU10  x x x x x  x 
Bosnia & Herzegovina  3 3 2 4 4  2.3 
Average SEE countries  x x x x x  x 
Turkmenistan  1 2.3 1 2.7 2 1 
Average CIS countries  x x x x x  x Ryszard Rapacki 
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If we bear in mind that in 1989 the overwhelming majority of pertinent 
scores for all transition economies in all nine areas involved assumed the 
value of 1, the pace of institutional convergence towards the EU15 
standards in Poland and the remaining CEE-10 countries looks impressive. 
The data in Table 1 show that in less than 15 years the countries concerned 
significantly narrowed or even closed the gap in institutional development 
vis-à-vis the reference level.
17 It is to be stressed in this context that the 
scores in 2011 are not much different from those recorded in 2003 (i.e. just 
before the EU accession). For example, for Poland the average score in 
2003 was 3.67 compared to 3.84 in 2011. Similar proportions apply for the 
remaining CEE-10 states.
18  
The progress in market reforms in CEE-10 countries becomes even more 
remarkable if we contrast their record with the experience of the worst 
performers in this regard in other sub-groups of transition economies, and 
most notably – some CIS and SEE countries (Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, 
Belarus, Bosnia & Herzegovina and Serbia). In some institutional areas the 
latter (e.g. Turkmenistan) have not departed yet from the command 
economy. One of the most important determinants of the rate and breadth 
of structural reforms in former communist countries was the “external 
anchor” or the prospect of EU membership. As shown, inter alia, in annual 
EBRD assessments, the CEE-10 countries invited to join the EU initiated 
their structural reforms earlier, implemented them much more effectively 
and with greater commitment, and today are much more advanced in the 
reform process than the remaining transition economies
19. Moreover, as 
IMF assessments show, the quality of institutions in the new EU member 
 
17  Particularly worth highlighting is the fact that – in contrast to Greece, Portugal and 
Spain in the early 1980s, i.e. prior to accession – the CEE countries dramatically 
improved the quality of their institutional infrastructure of the market before joining 
the EU. 
18  Own calculations based on R. Rapacki, Z. Matkowski, Economic Situation and the 
Progress of Market Reforms (chapter III), in: „New Europe – Report on 
Transformation”, ed. by D. Rosati, pp. 100-101. Institute of Eastern Studies, XIV 
Economic Forum, Krynica, 9-11 September 2004.  
19  The only exception is Croatia, which stands out favorably in the advancement of 
structural reform, even compared with the most recent EU entrants, i.e. Bulgaria 
and Romania. Poland and Greece – Two Contrasting EU Enlargement Experiences 
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states is currently higher on average than in other countries in the world at 
a similar level of development. In the remaining transition economies, 
particularly CIS countries, the development of the institutional market 
infrastructure is slightly lower than in other countries with a similar level of 
development.
20It is worth emphasizing that the progress of structural 
reform was an important driver of economic growth in transition countries. 
The regression analysis conducted for the purpose of another study co-
authored by this author reveals that the countries, which were the most 
advanced in the process of systemic transformation, achieved faster GDP 
growth on average in 1990-2010 than those lagging behind in this process 
(Chart 1). The positive correlation between these two variables is especially 
clear in CEE-10 group. By contrast, in countries such as Tajikistan, Bosnia 
& Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia, Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine, the 
lack of major structural reforms contributed to negative GDP growth rates 
throughout the analyzed period.  
 
Chart 1: The Progress of Structural Reforms and Economic Growth in Transition 
Countries
 (excluding Belarus, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan). 
 
Source: R. Rapacki, Z. Matkowski, M. Próchniak, Transition Countries: Economic Situation in 2010 and 
the Progress of Market Reforms, Warsaw School of Economics, Warsaw 2012.  
 
20  See IMF, World Economic Outlook 2002, Washington D.C. 2002, p. 102.  
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Table 2 summarizes the economic growth performance of CEE-10 
economies between 1990 and 2011. Poland was the growth leader over the 
whole transition period though it lost its leading position in the group after 
2000. Nevertheless, the country proved particularly resilient to the adverse 
external shock caused by the global economic crisis of 2008-09 - it was the 
only economy (both in CEE-10 and in the entire European Union) that 
remained on the growth path even in 2009.
21  
 
Table 2: Economic Growth in CEE-10 Countries, 1990-2011 
Country 
Real GDP Growth Rate 
  Real GDP Index in 
2011  Average Annual 
% Growth 
Annual % Growth 
1990-2011 2009  2010 2011  1989=100  2000=100 
Poland 3.1  1.6  3.9  4.3  194  152 
Bulgaria 0.4  –5.5  0.2  2.2  109  152 
Czech Republic  1.6  –4.7  2.7  1.8  140  142 
Estonia 1.6  –14.3  2.3  8.0  140  153 
Hungary 1.2  –6.8  1.3  1.4  130  123 
Latvia 0.1  –17.7  –0.3  4.5  101  150 
Lithuania 0.2  –14.8  1.4  6.1  105  162 
Romania 0.8  –6.6  –1.6  1.7  118  152 
Slovakia 2.3  –4.9  4.2  2.9  166  164 
Slovenia 1.8  –8.0  1.4  1.1  149  132 
EU15 1.8  –4.3  2.0  1.5  148  115 
Sources: Eurostat; World Bank, World Development Indicators Database; EBRD, Transition Report 
Database; UN Economic Commission for Europe (2005), Economic Survey for Europe, No. 2, Geneva; 
WIIW (2006), Special Issue on Economic Prospects of Central, East and Southeast Europe (Research 
Report 325), Vienna; own calculations. 
While interpreting the data in the table we should keep in mind that it 
includes the deep contraction of output in the early years of transition 
(“transformation recession”). For example, in Poland the cumulative GDP 
 
21  It is worth noting here that Poland demonstrated a similar resilience to adverse 
external shocks also in the past – including in particular the economic crisis in 
Southeastern Asia in 1997 and the Russian crisis in 1998.  Poland and Greece – Two Contrasting EU Enlargement Experiences 
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slump in 1990-91 amounted to nearly 18% whereas in the Baltic countries 
it ranged between 45 and 60 per cent in 1990-95. The growth figures 
exclusive of the transformation recession effects would greatly improve – 
for example in Poland the average annual growth rate of real GDP between 
1992 and 2011 amounted to 4.5% which is close to that recorded by Ireland 
in a comparable period (cf. table 4 in the next section).  
The data in table 2 also shows that – except for Poland – the short-term 
adverse effects of the recent global economic crisis were more severe in 
CEE-10 countries than in the EU15. The contraction of output was 
particularly deep in three Baltic states. However, unlike in the GIPS 
countries the recession in CEE-10 took only one year (exception being 
Latvia and Romania) and was followed by a steady rebounding in 2010-11 
which was particularly spectacular in Estonia (GDP growth in 2011 by 8%) 
and Lithuania (6.1%).
22  
As a derivative of their growth performance most of the CEE-10 economies 
succeeded in catching up or advancing the real economic convergence 
towards the EU15 (table 3). Poland again was the best performer in this 
respect – between 1989 and 2011 it narrowed the pertinent development 
gap by 20 percentage points, followed by Slovakia (9 points), Estonia and 
Romania (8 points). In contrast, three members of this group (Bulgaria, 
Czech Republic and Latvia) have been subject to a real economic 
divergence trend.   
  
 
22  This trend, if combined with the progress made in structural reforms and a relatively 
high quality of their institutional endowment, seems to indicate good prospects of 
recovery even in those CEE-10 economies most severely hit by the crisis (in 
particular the Baltic states who pursued sound economic policies after 2008 and 
embarked on more advanced and comprehensive structural reforms including public 
finance on the expenditure side rather than revenue). 
 Ryszard Rapacki 
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Table 3: Development Gap in New EU Member Countries vis-à-vis the EU15 
Average, 1989-2011 (GDP per capita in PPP, EU15 = 100) 
Country 1989  2003  2009  2010  2011 
(preliminary) 
Bulgaria 46  30  40  40  40 
Czech Republic   75 68  75  73  73 
Estonia 54  48  58  58  62 
Hungary 56  55  59  59  59 
Latvia 52  38  46  46  48 
Lithuania 52  43  50  52  55 
Poland 38  43  55  57  58 
Romania 34  27  43  42  42 
Slovakia 59  48  66  67  68 
Slovenia 74  74  79  77  77 
 
Source:  R. Rapacki, M. Próchniak, The EU Enlargement and Economic Growth in the CEE New Member 
Countries, “European Economy, Economic Papers” no. 367, March 2009; Eurostat; own calculations. 
 
If we take into account the post-accession period alone, by 2011 all CEE-
10 or new EU member countries succeeded in narrowing their income gaps 
towards the EU15. The best performer in this regard was Slovakia (20 
percentage points) followed by Poland and Romania (15 points), and 
Estonia (14 points).  
 
5.  Economic Growth and Real Convergence in Greece 
and other GIPS Countries 
 Between the early 1970s and mid-1990s the European Union witnessed 
several waves of enlargement which made it eventually grow from six to 
fifteen member countries. One of the overriding objectives of this new 
phase of regional integration was to diminish the existing disparities in Poland and Greece – Two Contrasting EU Enlargement Experiences 
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GDP per capita levels between the less-advanced and more developed 
members of the enlarged EU (real convergence). With a view to achieve 
this goal, a special system of financial transfers from the latter group to the 
former, including structural and cohesion funds, was designed. Tables 4 
and 5 below give account of the results of this strategy. 
 
Table 4:  Real GDP Growth in EU15 Countries*, 1981-2010 (average annual 
growth rates, %) 
* excluding Luxembourg 
Source:  R. Rapacki, Regional Integration and Development Asymmetries, in: M. Zimmek and A. Koesler 
(eds.), “Elements of Regional Integration. A Multidimensional Approach”, Nomos, Baden-Baden 2008; 
own calculations based on IMF data (World Economic Outlook, October 2007). 
As the data shown in Table 4 demonstrates, between 1980 and 2010 the 
economic growth trajectories within the EU15 seem largely consistent with 
the β-convergence hypothesis. The latter implies that countries with lower 
Country 1981-
1990 
1991-
2000 
2001-
2010 
2009 2010 2011 1981-
2010 
Greece   0.7  2.3  2.1  -3.3  -3.5  -6.9  1.7 
Ireland  2.8  6.8  2.5  -7.0  -0.4  0.7  4.0 
Portugal  3.7  2.9  0.7  -2.9  1.4  -1.8  2.5 
Spain  2.9  2.9  2.1  -3.7  -0.1  1.7  2.6 
Austria  2.1 2.5  1.6 -3.8  2.3  3.1 2.1 
Belgium  2.0 2.3  1.3 -2.8  2.2  1.9 1.9 
Denmark  2.1 2.6  0.6 -5.8  1.3  1.0 1.8 
Finland  3.0 1.9  1.8 -8.4  3.7  2.9 2.3 
France  2.4 2.0  1.1 -3.1  1.7  1.7 2.0 
Germany  2.3 2.0  1.0 -5.1  3.7  3.0 1.8 
Italy  2.4 1.6  0.4 -5.5  1.8  0.4 1.5 
Netherlands  2.2 3.0  1.4 -3.5  1.7  1.2 2.2 
Sweden  2.2 1.9  2.2 -5.0  6.2  3.9 2.1 
UK  2.8 2,4  1.7 -4.4  2.1  0.7 2.3 
EU-15  average  2.3 2.5  1.2 -4.4  2.0  1.4 2.0 Ryszard Rapacki 
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initial GDP per capita levels should display higher growth rates than more 
developed ones.
23 Table 5 partly confirms this pattern; it shows that some 
of the GIPS countries, and in particular Ireland, Spain and Portugal (until 
2000) tended to grow faster compared to the EU15 average while some of 
the richer economies (notably Denmark, France and Italy) exhibited slower 
GDP growth. However, the overall growth record in the EU15 has been to 
some extent ambiguous as a number of more developed countries – in 
particular Finland, the Netherlands and the UK – recorded GDP growth 
rates above the average.  
 
Table 5:  Relative Development Levels in EU-15 Countries*, 1980-2010 (based on 
GDP per capita in PPP in constant 2000 prices, EU15 = 100) 
Country  1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2007 2010 
Greece   80  74  66  65  73  81  81  80 
Ireland  66  68  74  86  115  128  133  116 
Portugal  60  58  66  67  70  70  71  72 
Spain  76  74  79  79  84  90  95  91 
Austria  112 113 112 114 116 114 115 115 
Belgium  109 105 106 106 110 108 108 108 
Denmark  122 125 114 117 115 113 112 115 
Finland  103 108 107  95  102 102 107 105 
France  110 109 108 105 101  99  99  98 
Germany  104 104 104 106 103 102 103 107 
Italy  105 106 105 105 103  93  94  92 
Netherlands  111 107 106 107 117 117 118 121 
Sweden  114 117 111 105 110 110 111 112 
United  Kingdom  97  100 101 102 102 106 106 102 
* excluding Luxembourg. 
Source:  R. Rapacki, Regional Integration and Development Asymmetries, op. cit.; author’s calculations 
based on Eurostat (Online at: www.epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu) and OECD data (Online at www.oecd.org). 
 
 
23    For the econometric proof supporting this claim see R. Rapacki, Regional 
Integration and Development Asymmetries, op.cit.  Poland and Greece – Two Contrasting EU Enlargement Experiences 
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This was a derivative of two opposite GDP growth trends between 1980 
and 2010 – while in 1980-95 the development gap vis-à-vis the EU15 
tended to widen even more, in the subsequent period until 2007 the Greek 
economy was succeeding in catching up to later turn around again since 
2008. As a result, by 2010 its GDP per capita level, relative to the EU15 
average, was exactly the same as in 1980. Moreover, if we account for the 
economic growth figures in 2011 the country was subject to a real 
divergence trend – by 2011 its GDP per capita represented only 75% of the 
average for the EU15.
24 The data shown in Table 4 also reveals that Greece 
proved the most vulnerable to the adverse external shock generated by the 
global economic crisis in 2008-09. Its economy slid into recession already 
in 2008 and continued its downward trend for four years in a row (2008-
11). The cumulative fall of output (GDP) over this period amounted to 
nearly 15 per cent. As we are going to argue in the next section, the poor 
macroeconomic performance or the failure story of Greece on both counts, 
i.e. the real economic divergence and vulnerability to adverse external 
shocks is not a coincidence or bad luck as it is deeply rooted in country’s 
long-term structural and institutional deficiencies. Similarly, these are 
institutional factors that are among the key determinants of the Polish 
success story in terms of both the real convergence and resilience to 
adverse external shocks, including a spectacular progress Poland made in 
structural reforms on its road from plan to market and the resulting 
relatively high quality of its institutional infrastructure. In the case of 
Greece another important explanatory variable should be seen in country’s 
economic policy pursued since its EU accession in 1982 including the use 
it made of the EU development funds. The latter effect has been 
additionally compounded by country-specific factors and in particular the 
widespread practice of “creative accounting” in Greek public finance and 
fudging with statistical information provided to the European Commission. 
 
24   Author’s estimates based on Eurostat data. According to the same estimates, 
derived from the most recent economic growth projections by the European 
Commission, this index is likely to further fall to 72% in 2012.  Ryszard Rapacki 
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6.  Greece (GIPS) vs. Poland (CEE-10) – a Comparative 
Picture of Institutional Quality   
An interesting insight into the potential causalities involved in our 
discussion on the comparative economic performance of Greece (and more 
broadly – GIPS countries) and Poland (CEE-10) can be derived from the 
‘varieties of capitalism’ approach. The approach, which was developed at 
the beginning of the past decade, assumes that the historical evolution of 
market institutions in industrialized countries of the Western hemisphere 
gave rise to the development of different models or varieties of capitalism. 
Depending on the set of criteria applied to distinguish between varying 
institutional infrastructures of the market economy in particular countries 
or their groups, two most widely used typologies can be singled out. The 
first such classification, best known in a version brought out by Amable,
 
involves five different types of capitalist market economies, i.e. (i) the 
Anglo-Saxon or market-based model, (ii) the Continental or welfare 
capitalism model, (iii) the Nordic or social-democratic model, (iv) the 
Mediterranean model, and (v) the Asian model of capitalism.
25The second 
typology developed by Hall and Soskice
26 and based on the prevailing 
mode of coordination of economic agents’ actions, makes a distinction 
between: (i) liberal market economies (LME) and (ii) coordinated market 
economies (CME).
27  
 
25   B. Amable, “The Diversity of Modern Capitalisms”, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford 2003. 
26  See P. Hall and D. Soskice, “Varieties of Capitalism. The Institutional Foundations 
of Comparative Advantage”, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2001. 
27  Some authors, such as e.g. Nölke and Vliegenthart, extend this bipolar typology and 
add a third variety of capitalism that is a ‘dependent market economy’ (DME). See, 
A. Nölke and A. Vliegenthart, Enlarging the varieties of capitalism: The emergence 
of dependent market economies in East Central Europe, “World Politics” 61 (4), 
2009. For still another typology of the ‘post-communist varieties of capitalism’, see 
D. Lane and M. Myant (eds), Varieties of Capitalism in Post-Communist Countries, 
Basingstoke, Palgrave 2007, and M. Myant and J. Drahokoupil, Transition 
Economies: Political Economy in Russia, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Wiley 
& Sons, Hoboken, NJ 2011. 
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As convincingly shown by Hanson,
28 the coexistence of different types of 
capitalism has been consistent with the process of European integration and 
has proceeded within the formal framework of acquis communautaire. 
According to Hanson, the trend towards greater institutional heterogeneity 
has become even more pronounced with the most recent EU enlargement, 
i.e. accession of the new members from Central and Eastern Europe. This is 
why in the discussion that follows we will mostly rely on this latter 
typology. 
Table 6 provides the relevant input information enabling a comparative 
analysis of strengths and weaknesses or the institutional quality in Greece 
and Poland, against a broader background of other GIPS and CEE-10 
countries and the remaining members of the European Union. A closer look 
at the data shown in the table authorizes the following remarks.  
Notes Table 6:   
pcGNI = per capita gross national income in international dollars at purchasing power 
parity, 2009, USA = 100; EoDB = country ranking on ‘ease of doing business’, 
including 183 countries; measures for 2011; Gov = sum of governance scores (voice and 
accountability, political stability, effectiveness of government, regulatory quality, rule 
of law, control of corruption), converted into %% of maximum possible score; possible 
range from +100 to -100. Scores are for 2010; CPI’10  = corruption perception index 
(CPI) by Transparency International for 2010, expressed as a percentage (100 = no 
corruption at all); Social cohesion = the Knell-Srholec score computed for 2005; the 
four components include the Gini coefficient, top marginal personal income and 
corporate tax rates, and government final consumption expenditure as % of GDP; 
Labour market = Knell and Srholec index for 2005 based on four components: difficulty 
of hiring and firing workers, cost of firing workers and rigidity of working hours; 
Business regulation = Knell and Srholec index for 2005 based on four sub-indices: 
number of start-up procedures to register a business, time to resolve insolvency, number 
of procedures to register property and the role of stock market relative to banking 
sector; Coordination Index = score on strategic coordination versus competition, is a 
sum of three indicators shown in the table: (i) social cohesion, (ii) labour market 
rigidity/flexibility, (iii) business regulation; + tending towards coordination; - tending 
towards competition. 
 
 
28  P. Hanson, The European Union’s Influence on the Development of Capitalism in 
Central Europe, mimeo, London 2006. Ryszard Rapacki 
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Table 6: Development Level and Selected Indicators of ‘Institutional Quality’, 
EU15 and CEE-10 Countries, 2005-2011 
Country  pcGNI  EoDB  Gov  CPI  Social 
cohesion 
Labour 
market 
Business 
regulation 
Coordination 
index 
EU15 countries 
Greece  63.1  100  16.3  35  1.4  6.5  3.7  11.6 
France  74.4  29  50.8  68  4.5  3.2  0.2  8.0 
Portugal  52.8  30  38.2  60  1.1  4.4  1.0  6.5 
Germany  80.7  19  57.5  79  2.4  3.3  -0.9  4.8 
Spain  69.0  44  35.5  61  2.9  4.9  -3.1  4.7 
Italy  69.8  87  20.7  39  2.5  1.7  0.3  4.5 
Austria  84.2  32  62.4  79  4.1  0.7  -1.0  3.8 
Netherlands  87.1  31  66.0  88  5.0  -0.2  -2.1  2.7 
Sweden  83.4  14  70.8  92  5.6  0  -4.7  0.9 
Denmark  85.0  5  72.7  91  1.6  -2.9  -0.3  -1.6 
Belgium  80.2  28  48.7  71  3.9  -3.5  -3.9  -3.4 
Ireland  72.4  10  58.2  80  -1.0  -0.9  -3.0  -4.8 
Finland  77.3  11  74.1  92  1.6  0.2  -7.3  -5.4 
UK  78.6  7  55.1  76  1.4  -2.9  -4.3  -5.8 
CEE-10 economies 
Slovenia  58.0  37  36.5  64  3  2.1  1.3  6.3 
Czech Rep.  52.5  64  36.8  46  2.4  -2.0  4.0  4.4 
Romania  31.8  72  7.5  37  -2.0  5.0  1.0  4.0 
Latvia  38.6  21  26.6  43  -1.8  1.5  1.0  0.6 
Bulgaria  29.1  59  8.2  38  -1.8  -1.8  2.8  -0.8 
Poland  40.0  62  32.3  53  -0.6  -1.1  0.0  -1.8 
Slovakia  48.4  48  31.1  43  -0.4  -4.5  2.1  -2.8 
Hungary  41.8  51  28.9  47  -1.8  0.0  -1.5  -3.3 
Lithuania  37.9  27  30.9  50  -1.3  0.1  -2.5  -3.8 
Estonia  41.9  24  43.3  65  -4.4  0.4  -1.7  -5.7 
 
Sources:  P. Hanson, The European Union’s Influence on the Development of Capitalism in Central 
Europe, mimeo, London 2006; M. Knell and M. Srholec, Emerging Varieties of Capitalism in Central 
and Eastern Europe, paper presented at a conference on „Varieties of Capitalism“, University of Paisley, 
23-24 September 2005; www.doingbusiness.org/EconomyRankings;  http://info.worldbank.org/ 
governance/kkz2004/year_report.asp?yearid=1,  World Bank, World Development Indicators 2011; 
www.transparency.org/cpi/2005/cpi2005.en.html; author’s calculations. 
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Firstly, the institutional system in Greece has exhibited many key features 
of a ‘coordinated market economy’ (CME), recording the highest positive 
value of the coordination scores among all EU member countries. 
Interestingly, a similar pattern – or high positive coordination scores – 
tended to also prevail in two other GIPS countries, i.e. Portugal and Spain, 
as well as in Italy (PIGS). The only deviation from the pattern established 
in GIPS countries was Ireland which may be deemed a liberal market 
economy (LME). Worth highlighting in this context is the fact that the 
CME type of capitalism entails as a rule a small margin of competition and 
free market-based coordination. Instead, under this institutional 
environment there is a relatively large room for government intervention 
and administrative discretion, extended public sector, and high incidence of 
bureaucratic hurdles for private entrepreneurship. In contrast to Greece, 
Poland – similar to five other CEE-10 countries – displayed institutional 
characteristics more compatible with the LME variety of capitalism.  
Secondly, it is interesting also to note that the general pattern described 
above for Greece applies to two out of three component scores for this 
country that is to labor market and business regulation. The former score 
(again the highest in the European Union) points out to a high rigidity of 
the Greek labor market and implicitly supports the claim that the country 
joined the European Monetary Union not being economically fully eligible 
for the membership (i.e. not meeting the most essential entry criterion 
emphasized by the theory of optimal currency areas that is the ability to 
absorb asymmetric shocks through “internal devaluation” or labor market 
adjustment).   
Thirdly, among all EU countries (including CEE-10), Greece has shown 
the lowest quality of institutions singled out in Table 6 under three 
headings that supplement the general coordination score, i.e. (i) ease of 
doing business, (ii) governance, and (iii) the incidence of perceived 
corruption.
29 Interestingly enough, Greece was closely followed by Italy as 
 
29  According to some estimates, the average level of bribes in Greece amounts to 
nearly 1,500 euro a year per inhabitant which ranks among the highest levels in 
Europe. Similarly, the size of the unreported or ‘shadow’ economy in Greece is 
estimated to be close or above 30% of official GDP.  Ryszard Rapacki 
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the second-worst performer in the ‘old’ EU; the two other GIPS countries – 
Portugal and Spain – displayed a relatively higher institutional quality 
while Ireland ranked among the top EU members in terms of its 
institutional development level.
30 Seen against this background, the quality 
of institutions being reviewed was higher in Poland compared to Greece 
(and Italy) in absolute terms and mostly comparable to those in Portugal in 
Spain. The same holds true for most CEE-10 countries (negative exceptions 
being Bulgaria and Romania) vis-à-vis GIPS group (with a positive 
exception of Ireland).   
Fourthly, the same trends become even more pronounced if we relate the 
pertinent indices of institutional quality in countries concerned to their 
economic development levels (see relevant figures shown in the first 
column of Table 6). It turns out then that the relative level of institutional 
quality in Poland was not only much higher than in Greece (and in Italy) 
but also higher compared to two other GIPS countries, i.e. Portugal and 
Spain. The same regularities hold – though in varying degree – to CEE-10 
group (except Bulgaria and Romania) vis-à-vis GIPS (excluding Ireland).  
Fifthly, as a wrap up of the foregoing comparative picture it can be 
concluded that in terms of institutional quality Greece performed much 
worse than Poland; moreover – with  one exception (governance) – it 
tended to underperform all CEE-10 countries on all three counts being 
reviewed (ease of doing business, governance and perceived corruption). 
This finding also generally applies (with a few exceptions) to two groups of 
latecomers to the EU – GIPS and CEE-10 – if we measure the institutional 
quality in relative terms, i.e. taking account of the respective GDP per 
capita levels. 
Another important explanatory variable of the Greek ‘failure story’ can be 
seen – as mentioned earlier – in the course and content of economic policy 
and development strategy pursued in Greece since the time of its EU 
accession.  
 
30  This may also suggest that Ireland is more shock-resistant, compared to other GIPS 
countries, and – after completing necessary reforms and structural adjustments – is 
more likely to withstand the adverse effects of the global economic crisis. Poland and Greece – Two Contrasting EU Enlargement Experiences 
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Their most salient traits can be summarized as follows:  
  Predominantly expansionary fiscal policy – budget deficit 
increased from 3% to nearly 18% as a proportion of GDP during the 1980s; 
similarly government spending skyrocketed. 
  Most part of the EU funds was channelled towards consumption 
purposes rather than investment. 
  EU funds made possible non-inflationary financing of budget 
deficit; simultaneously they compensated the crowding out of private 
domestic investment by government spending. 
  In the short run this strategy made possible a fast increase of 
consumption and incomes, in line with public support for the government. 
  However, in the long run government policy discouraged private 
investment and failed in creating proper conditions for sustainable 
economic growth. 
  Other policy-rooted determinants of the Greek ‘failure story’ 
include in particular:  
(i)  excessive role of public sector in the economy (20% of GDP);
31 
(ii)  protectionist policy vis-à-vis domestic financial sector 
discouraging potential competition and entry;  
(iii)  unfavourable government and social attitudes towards foreign 
investment;  
(iv)  low efficiency of investing EU aid funds. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
31  Interestingly enough, the size of the public sector in Greece has started to rise again 
since 2008. Ryszard Rapacki 
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7.   Summary and conclusions 
The major findings stemming from our discussion in this text may be 
summarized under the following heads.  
(a) The breadth and complexity of the challenges Poland and other CEE-10 
countries had to face while entering the road of systemic transformation 
was by far greater compared to past and in particular – current problems of 
Greece (and the remaining GIPS countries) in the aftermath of the global 
financial and economic crisis of 2008-09. 
(b) Poland was the best performer among CEE-10 countries (and one of the 
top two performers in CEE-10 and GIPS combined, comparable to Ireland) 
both in terms of economic growth, real economic convergence and 
resilience to adverse external shocks whereas Greece was the worst 
performing country both within GIPS and the two groups of EU 
latecomers. 
(c) The poor macroeconomic performance or the failure story of Greece on 
both counts, i.e. the real economic divergence and vulnerability to adverse 
external shocks is not a coincidence or bad luck as it is deeply rooted in 
country’s long-term structural and institutional deficiencies.  
 
(d) Similarly, these are institutional factors that are among the key 
determinants of the Polish success story in terms of both the real 
convergence and resilience to adverse external shocks, including a 
spectacular progress Poland made in structural reforms on its road from 
plan to market and the resulting relatively high quality of its institutional 
infrastructure. 
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(e) Seen from the institutional perspective known as the ‚varieties of 
capitalism‘approach, two most salient features of the institutional 
infrastructure that may have contributed to the contrasting records of 
Greece and Poland are worth stressing. First, Greece exhibited strong 
resemblance to a ‘coordinated market economy’ (CME variety of 
capitalism) whereas Poland shared many institutional properties with a 
pattern named a ‘liberal market economy’ (LME). Second, the quality of 
institutions in Greece was much lower compared to Poland, the remaining 
GIPS and most other CEE-10 countries – in particular Greece was the 
worst performer (or close) in terms of: 
(i) ease of doing business,  
(ii) quality of governance, and  
(iii) incidence of perceived corruption. 
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